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Abstract—Power systems have distinctive features that greatly
complicate the development of auction designs. This study re-
views the theory and practice of auction design as it relates
speciﬁcally to U.S. restructured wholesale power markets, i.e.,
centrally-administered wholesale power markets with congestion
managed by locational marginal prices. Basic auction concepts
such as reservation value, net seller surplus, net buyer surplus,
competitive market clearing, market efﬁciency, market pricing
rules, supply offers, demand bids, strategic capacity withholding,
and market power are explained and illustrated. Complicating
factors speciﬁc to wholesale power markets are clariﬁed, and
recent advances in computational tools designed to address these
complications are brieﬂy noted.
Index Terms—Auction design, restructured wholesale power
markets, objectives, pricing rules, bid/offer-based optimal power
ﬂow, locational marginal prices, congestion rents
I. INTRODUCTION
A
UCTION theory is often touted, with justiﬁcation, as an
economic success story ([1], [2]). Auction theory has
been used to facilitate the design of auction markets for a
wide range of goods, services, and ﬁnancial assets. Examples
include carbon emission permits in Germany, 3G mobile-
phone licenses in the UK, and U.S. Treasury bills.
The optimal design of auctions for real-time, day-ahead, and
other short-term wholesale power markets became a hot topic
in the late 1990s with the restructuring of many wholesale
power markets around the world. For example, as Joskow
[3] notes, over 50% of generating capacity in the U.S. is
now operating within the footprint of a restructured wholesale
power market whose core architecture includes a day-ahead
market organized as a double auction.
Nevertheless, auctions for restructured wholesale power
markets are difﬁcult to justify in terms of existing auction
theory. The main ﬁnding of auction theory to date is the
famous Revenue Equivalence Theorem (RET), roughly stated
as follows [1, p. 17]: Consider a collection of potential buyers
bidding for a single object being sold by a single seller.
Then, given certain regularity conditions, any design for this
auction yields the same expected revenue to the seller. The
bulk of auction theory research to date has built on the RET
foundation. The difﬁculty for power industry researchers is
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that real-world power markets tend to involve large deviations
from the RET assumptions.
Consider, in particular, the many ways in which a restruc-
tured wholesale power market violates the RET assumptions.
A restructured wholesale power market is an open-ended
dynamic game among traders, a market operator, and one or
more regulatory agencies. Traders (electric power producers,
load-serving entities, power brokers) are highly heterogeneous,
each with their own distinct goals, constraints, and structural
attributes. The traders repeatedly make multi-unit supply offers
and demand bids within one or more interrelated submarkets
that constitute the wholesale power market in the large. These
submarkets include spot and forward energy markets supported
by a variety of submarkets for such things as ancillary services,
capacity installation, and ﬁnancial hedging instruments. The
reservation values of the traders – i.e., the minimum sale
prices and maximum purchase prices at which they are willing
to trade – can vary over time in response to changes in
such factors as fuel costs, weather conditions, and regulatory
policies. When grid congestion arises, the energy market
can segment into separate energy submarkets (load pockets)
within which power suppliers proﬁt from higher-than-normal
energy prices because electric power quantities offered for
sale at different buses now effectively represent distinct goods
supporting a distinct array of prices.
Moreover, the extraordinarily complicated nature of the
rules and regulations governing the operations of restructured
wholesale power markets can provide opportunities for market
participants to game the system to their advantage through
strategic behaviors, either individually or in tacit collusion.
Such gaming can involve anticompetitive behaviors (e.g.,
exaggeration of costs, physical capacity withholding, and entry
deterrence) that result in operating inefﬁciencies and that raise
adequacy and security concerns. Interestingly, the complexities
of these rules and regulations, including in particular auction
design features, have in many cases arisen for the very purpose
of preventing such gaming.
In summary, researchers interested in the development of
auctions for restructured wholesale power markets need to
push the envelope of received auction theory to handle many
additional complicating factors. The purpose of this auction
primer is therefore threefold: (1) to explain and illustrate
basic auction concepts and terminology relevant for restruc-
tured wholesale power markets; (2) to clarify the types of
complicating factors that speciﬁcally arise for double-auction
implementations of day-ahead markets within restructured
wholesale power markets; and (3) to brieﬂy note promising
developments in computational modeling tools speciﬁcally2
designed to address these complicating factors.
II. AUCTION BASICS
A. Competitive Market Clearing
A market is any public context in which the selling and
buying of a good, service, or ﬁnancial asset takes place.
Hereafter, the symbol q will be used to denote any particular
quantity of good, service, or ﬁnancial asset, and p will be used
to denote the (per-unit) price of q. For example, q could denote
a quantity of apples measured in bushels, and p could denote
the price per bushel.
An auction market is a market that is centrally managed
by an auctioneer (or “central clearing house”) that facili-
tates trades between sellers and buyers. Auction outcomes
are determined by the particular pricing rules enforced by
the auctioneer in pursuit of its objectives. As clariﬁed in
section III, day-ahead markets in U.S. restructured wholesale
power markets are organized as double auctions. A double
auction is a two-sided auction in which sellers submit supply
offers and buyers submit demand bids.
An (inverse) true supply schedule for a seller i is a schedule
giving the minimum price p that seller i would be willing
to accept for each successive quantity unit supplied. These
successive minimum sale prices are referred to as seller i’s
(sale) reservation values. Conversely, an (inverse) true demand
schedule for a buyer j is a schedule giving the maximum price
p that buyer j would be willing to pay for each successive
quantity unit demanded. These maximum purchase prices are
referred to as buyer j’s (purchase) reservation values.1
A simple illustration is given in Table I for gourmet Honey-
crisp apples. Supplies and demands at wholesale are measured
in bushels. The table entries give sale and purchase reservation
values measured in $/bushel. For example, the table entries for
seller S1 indicate that his minimum acceptable sale price is
$10 for a ﬁrst bushel, $50 for a second bushel, $65 for a
third bushel, and $70 for a fourth bushel. Four bushels are his
maximum supply capacity, so his effective reservation value
for any additional bushels is inﬁnite. Similarly, the table entries
for buyer B2 indicate that his maximum acceptable purchase
price is $70 for a ﬁrst bushel, $50 for a second bushel, $25
for a third bushel, and $0 for any additional bushels.
The true total supply schedule for a particular market gives
the minimum sale reservation value p for each successive
quantity unit supplied. This schedule can be represented as
a function p = S(q), where p denotes the minimum sale
reservation value for the last quantity unit supplied at q. The
function p = S(q) is constructed from the individual sellers’
true supply schedules by placing the sellers’ reservation values
1The qualiﬁer “true” is used to indicate that a supply or demand schedule
accurately reﬂects sale or purchase reservation values. In section II-C the
concept of a “reported” supply or demand schedule will be introduced
for strategic traders whose offers and bids can diverge from reservation
values. Inverse supply and demand schedules give reservation values for each
additional quantity unit, whereas ordinary supply and demand schedules give
maximum quantities that sellers and buyers are willing to sell and purchase
for each successively higher price. This study uses the inverse form because
the stress is on sellers and buyers who actively make price offers and bids
for different considered quantities. For expositional simplicity, the qualiﬁer
“inverse” for supply and demand schedules will hereafter be omitted.
TABLE I
ILLUSTRATION: TRUE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SCHEDULES FOR TWO
SELLERS AND THREE BUYERS OF HONEYCRISP APPLES
Bushels S1 S2 B1 B2 B3
1 $10.00 $10.00 $70.00 $70.00 $25.00
2 $50.00 $50.00 $70.00 $50.00 0
3 $65.00 $70.00 $65.00 $25.00 0
4 $70.00 $70.00 $65.00 0 0
5 1 1 0 0 0
7 1 1 0 0 0
8 1 1 0 0 0
Fig. 1. Plots of the true total supply and demand schedules in Table I. The
competitive market clearing points (q;p) are 4  q  5 and p = 65.
in ascending order. Conversely, the true total demand schedule
for a particular market gives the maximum purchase reserva-
tion value p for each successive quantity unit demanded. This
schedule can be represented as a function p = D(q), where
p denotes the maximum purchase reservation value for the
last quantity unit demanded at q. The function p = D(q) is
constructed from the individual buyers’ true demand schedules
by placing the buyers’ reservation values in descending order.
Fig. 1 plots the true supply and demand schedules for the
Table I market. A second example is given in Fig. 2.
The net seller surplus on a quantity unit sold is the
difference between the actual sale price received by the seller
for this unit and the seller’s reservation value for this unit. The
net buyer surplus on a quantity unit bought is the difference
Fig. 2. A second illustration of true total supply and demand schedules. The
competitive market clearing points (q;p) are q = 5 and 50  p  60.3
Fig. 3. Net seller surplus, net buyer surplus, and total net seller-buyer surplus
calculations and depictions for the true total supply and demand schedules
presented in Table I and plotted in Figure 1.
between the buyer’s reservation value for this unit and the
actual price paid by the buyer for this unit.
A quantity-price combination (q;p) is called a Compet-
itive Market Clearing (CMC) point if plots of the true total
supply schedule S(q) and the true total demand schedule D(q)
(with vertical segments included) intersect at this point; that
is, if p=S(q)=D(q). The price p is called a CMC price
level, and the quantity q is called a CMC output level. In
general, CMC points can be multiple, unique, or non-existent.
Multiplicity of CMC points is only possible for “step function”
supply and demand schedules that have ﬂat segments (either
horizontally or vertically).2 See, for example, Figs. 1 and 2.
What is the economic meaning of a CMC point? It can be
shown that (q;p) is a CMC point if and only if the following
two no-more-surplus conditions hold at this point: (a) Taking
p as the given market price, no seller perceives an opportunity
to strictly increase his extracted net seller surplus by changing
his quantity offer; and (b) taking p as the given market
price, no buyer perceives an opportunity to strictly increase
his extracted net buyer surplus by changing his quantity bid.
Consequently, if proﬁt-seeking traders take prices as given
at a CMC point, they perceive no reason to unilaterally deviate
from their current quantities supplied or demanded. In fact,
however, traders in many real-world wholesale markets (e.g.,
restructured wholesale power markets) are not price takers.
Rather, they are strategic participants in dynamic trading
games requiring the repeated submission of supply offers and
demand bids in the form of quantity-price schedules. This
issue is further considered in section II-C below.
The net seller surplus at a CMC point (q;p) is the area
between the horizontal line at the price level p and the
true total supply schedule, up to q. The net seller surplus
at (q;p) measures seller welfare at this point. It is the
difference between what sellers would actually receive for the
sale of q units at price p, i.e., p  q, and the minimum
payment they are willing to receive for the sale of q units.
2Discussions of markets in standard economic textbooks typically assume
a strictly increasing true total supply schedule and a strictly decreasing true
total demand schedule having a unique intersection point. On the other hand,
supply offers and demand bids in U.S. restructured wholesale power markets
(e.g., MISO [4]) are typically required to take the form of step functions.
The net buyer surplus at a CMC point (q;p) is the area
between the true total demand curve and the horizontal line at
the price level p, up to q. The net buyer surplus at (q;p)
measures buyer welfare at this point. It is the difference
between the maximum payment that buyers are willing to
make for q units and the amount that buyers would actually
pay for the purchase of q units at price p, i.e., p  q.
The total net seller-buyer surplus (TNSBS) at any CMC
point (q;p), i.e., the sum of net seller surplus and net buyer
surplus at this point, is the maximum amount of net seller and
buyer surplus that can be extracted from the market. That is,
there is no way to arrange trades so that the total extracted net
seller and buyer surplus is greater than at the CMC point. This
follows from the arrangement of seller and buyer reservation
values in ascending and descending orders in the construction
of the true total supply and demand schedules.
The net seller surplus, net buyer surplus, and TNSBS
corresponding to any one of the multiple CMC points depicted
in Fig. 1 are calculated and plotted in Fig. 3. The invariance
of TNSBS to the particular selection of a CMC point for a
market with multiple CMC points follows from the deﬁnition
of a CMC point.
B. Market Efﬁciency and Pricing Rules
Efﬁciency means that resources are not being wasted.
Economists identify two types of wastage: (i) physical
wastage, in the sense that some valued units of resource remain
unused; and (ii) wastage of value, in the sense that some units
of resource are not being used by those who value them most.
The concept of “market efﬁciency” addresses both (i) and
(ii). Let MaxTNSBS denote the maximum possible total net
surplus that sellers and buyers could extract from a particular
market during some time period T for which sale and purchase
reservation values remain unchanged. If a CMC point exists,
MaxTNSBS coincides with the TNSBS extracted at this CMC
point. Also, let ActualTNSBS denote the actual total net
surplus that sellers and buyers manage to extract from the
market during T. Then the market efﬁciency (ME) of this
market during T is measured as follows:






By construction, 0%  ME  100% if sellers never sell
quantity units at prices below their reservation values and
buyers never purchase quantity units at prices above their
reservation values.
The quantity units lying to the left of the largest CMC
quantity level are called inframarginal, and all other units are
called extramarginal. ME will be 100% for a market during
a given time period T if all inframarginal units trade, no
extramarginal units trade, and the price paid to a seller equals
the price paid by the buyer for each traded unit. An ME below
100% can only occur if some inframarginal unit fails to trade,
some extramarginal unit succeeds in being traded, or the price
received by some seller in a trade is not equal to the price
paid by the buyer.
For example, for the market depicted in Fig. 1, suppose sell-
ers S1 and S2 sell their ﬁve inframarginal bushels to buyers B14
and B2 with sale price equal to purchase price for each bushel.
If these ﬁve bushels are inframarginal for B1 and B2, then the
total net surplus extracted will be MaxTNSBS=$155 (i.e., the
sum of the ﬁve purchase reservation values minus the sum
of the ﬁve sale reservation values) regardless of the precise
trading prices or the precise seller-buyer matchings. However,
suppose S1 instead sells his ﬁrst ($10) inframarginal bushel
to the extramarginal buyer B3, whose purchase reservation
value for this bushel is only $25. Then the actual total net
surplus extracted in this market will be no greater than $115,
regardless of remaining trades, implying a deadweight loss of
at least $40 and a ME strictly below 100%.
Economists adhere to the market efﬁciency conception (1)
because they are concerned that efﬁciency be achieved in both
the short and longer run. Their short-run concern is to ensure
maximum net surplus extraction using existing resources.
Their longer-run concern is to provide proper incentives to
encourage investment in new resources for producing and
extracting more net surplus in the future. In particular, sellers
with new ideas for supplying output at lower unit cost should
have an incentive to introduce these ideas into a market to
compete against current sellers for the extraction of seller
surplus. Similarly, buyers with new ideas for gaining more
beneﬁt per unit of output purchased should have an incentive to
introduce these ideas into a market to compete against current
buyers for the extraction of buyer surplus.
It is instructive to consider how market efﬁciency is poten-
tially enhanced in both the short run and longer run under a
uniform CMC pricing rule.
As seen above, the total net seller and buyer surplus
extracted at any CMC point is the maximum that can be
extracted during a time period T for which sale and pur-
chase reservation values remain unchanged. Thus, short-run
efﬁciency is achieved if the market price for all quantity units
is at a CMC price level.
However, the extraction of MaxTNSBS does not require a
uniform CMC pricing rule. Rather, MaxTNSBS is extracted
from the market during T if the following three conditions
hold: (i) Traded output is at a CMC level q; (ii) only
inframarginal units are traded; and (iii) for each traded unit,
the price paid to the seller equals the price paid by the buyer.
For example, these three conditions are consistent with a
k-discriminatory pricing rule (k 2 [0;1]) deﬁned as follows:
For any matched seller-buyer pair with sale and purchase
reservation values ps  pb, set their “strike” price at the level
pk = kpb+[1 k]ps lying between their reservation values.
This pricing rule simply distributes the net surplus generated
by a trade between a seller-buyer pair in a ratio determined by
k without affecting the amount of this net surplus. In particular,
then, ignoring possible deleterious effects on incentives for
truthful revelation of costs and capacities, as well as serious
concerns related to recovery of non-variable costs, short-
run efﬁciency could alternatively be achieved by using a
0-discriminatory pricing rule that awards all generated net
surplus to buyers.3
3This is essentially the approach advocated for wholesale power markets in
a series of studies on “payment cost minimization”; see, e.g., Yan et al. [5].
On the other hand, from a longer-run efﬁciency point of
view, setting market price at a uniform CMC price level
encourages sellers and buyers to innovate. In contrast, use of
a k-discriminatory pricing rule, particularly with an extreme
setting of k = 0 or k = 1, would tend to discourage innovation
by reducing or even eliminating the gains to innovation.
More precisely, a CMC uniform pricing rule permits sellers
of inframarginal units to keep any additional net seller surplus
(net earnings) garnered from a lowering of their costs and
hence a lowering of their sale reservation values. This provides
sellers with an incentive to ﬁnd new ways to supply output
using fewer inputs or to supply more output from the same
inputs. Similarly, setting market price at a uniform CMC
price level permits buyers of inframarginal units to keep any
additional net buyer surplus (net earnings) garnered from the
development of new ways of achieving more beneﬁt from
each purchased unit of output and hence an increase in their
purchase reservation values. This provides buyers with an
incentive to pursue such developments.
All of the above analysis is conditioned on the presumption
that the auctioneer knows (or can determine) the true reser-
vation values of sellers and buyers. In fact, however, it is not
necessarily to the advantage of sellers and buyers to reveal
these private attributes in their publicly reported supplies and
demands. This issue is taken up in the next section.
C. Strategic Trade Behavior
An offer to sell that is reported to an auctioneer is called
a supply offer. A bid to buy that is reported to an auctioneer
is called a demand bid. Hereafter it is assumed that supply
offers take the form of reported supply schedules and demand
bids take the form of reported demand schedules. Moreover,
it is assumed that the objective of each seller and buyer in
an auction is to attain the highest possible extraction of net
surplus (net earnings) for itself. All else equal, then, sellers
are better off the higher the prices they obtain for the quantity
units they sell, and buyers are better off the lower the prices
they pay for the quantity units they purchase.
Seller market power refers to the ability of a seller to
proﬁtably raise the sale price(s) he receives for the quantity
units he sells, relative to CMC conditions. Buyer market power
refers to the ability of a buyer to proﬁtably lower the purchase
price(s) he pays for quantity units he purchases, relative to
CMC conditions. Sellers and buyers can attempt to exercise
market power in two basic ways. First, sellers and buyers can
misrepresent their true reservation values in their supply offers
and demand bids. Alternatively, sellers and buyers can reduce
the number of units they offer to sell or bid to buy in their
supply offers and demand bids, even if the sale and purchase
of these units would generate a positive net surplus.
For example, consider a market with sale and purchase
reservation values as depicted in Fig. 2, and suppose the
proposed CMC point for this market is q = 5 and p =
50. Sellers have two possible ways they might try to increase
their extracted net seller surplus relative to this CMC point:
economic capacity withholding, i.e., offering units for sale at
prices higher than their sale reservation values; and physical5
Fig. 4. Simpliﬁed depiction of the core two-settlement system architecture
of U.S. restructured wholesale power markets.
capacity withholding, i.e., withholding units from sale. It is
easily checked, for example, that seller S1 obtains a higher net
seller surplus than at the proposed CMC point if he withdraws
his second ($50) inframarginal unit from sale, thus ensuring
a higher market price of $60 for his ﬁrst ($10) inframarginal
unit. Indeed, all three sellers obtain higher net seller surplus
at this higher market price.
Recall from section II-A that sellers and buyers have no
incentive to individually change their quantity sales or pur-
chases at CMC points, assuming they take the market price
as given. The important point above is that seller S1 does not
take the market price as given. Rather, he correctly perceives
his ability to increase the market price to his own advantage
by withdrawing one of his quantity units from sale.
The detection of market power is particularly problematic
for restructured wholesale power markets due to grid conges-
tion effects on locational marginal prices. Before taking up
this issue in section IV, below, we ﬁrst set out in simpliﬁed
form the ﬂow of daily activities in a restructured wholesale
power market encompassing an ISO-managed double-auction
for a day-ahead energy market.
III. SIMPLIFIED FLOW OF DAILY ACTIVITIES IN U.S.
RESTRUCTURED WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS
A. Overview
Fig. 4 depicts several core features of ISO-managed restruc-
tured wholesale power markets. Fig. 5 depicts ISO activities
on a typical day D. A more detailed description of the logical
ﬂow of daily market events is as follows:4
 The wholesale power market operates over an AC trans-
mission grid during successive days D, with each day D
consisting of 24 successive hours H = 00,01, ...,23.
 The wholesale power market includes an Independent
System Operator (ISO) and a collection of energy traders
consisting of Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) and Genera-
tion Companies (GenCos) distributed across the buses of
the transmission grid.
4This logical ﬂow of events is captured in the AMES Wholesale Power
Market Test Bed [6] developed by H. Li, J. Sun, and L. Tesfatsion for the
study of ISO-managed restructured wholesale power markets with learning
traders operating over AC transmission grids.
Fig. 5. Simpliﬁed depiction of ISO wholesale power market activities during
a typical day D
 The objective of the ISO is the reliable and efﬁcient
operation of the wholesale power market over time.
 In an attempt to attain this objective, the ISO undertakes
the daily operation of a day-ahead market settled by
means of locational marginal pricing (LMP), i.e., the
determination of prices for electric power in accordance
with the location and timing of its injection into, or
withdrawal from, the transmission grid.5
 The objective of each LSE is to secure for itself the high-
est possible net earnings each day through the purchase of
electric power in the day-ahead market and the resale of
this electric power to its downstream (retail) customers.
 During the morning of each day D, each LSE chooses
a demand bid to submit to the ISO for the day-ahead
market for day D+1. Each demand bid consists of two
parts: a ﬁxed demand bid (i.e., a 24-hour price-insensitive
load proﬁle); and 24 price-sensitive demand bids (one for
each hour), each consisting of a demand function deﬁned
over a purchase capacity interval.
 The objective of each GenCo is to secure for itself the
highest possible net earnings each day through the sale
of electric power in the day-ahead market.
 During the morning of each day D, each GenCo chooses
a supply offer to submit to the ISO for use in all 24 hours
of the day-ahead market for day D+1. Each supply offer
consists of a reported marginal cost function deﬁned over
a reported operating capacity interval.
 After receiving demand bids from LSEs and supply offers
from GenCos during the morning of day D, the ISO
determines and publicly reports hourly dispatch levels
and LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1 as the
solution to hourly bid/offer-based DC optimal power ﬂow
(DC-OPF) problems. Transmission grid congestion is
managed by the inclusion of congestion cost components
in LMPs.
 Any differences that arise during day D between actual
5Roughly stated, a locational marginal price at any particular transmission
grid bus is the least cost to the system of servicing one additional megawatt
(MW) of ﬁxed demand (load) for electric power at that bus.6
Fig. 6. True total supply and demand schedules during the peak-demand
hour 17 of a day-ahead energy double-auction market for a benchmark (no-
learning) 5-bus test case explored in [7] using the AMES Test Bed.
day-D demand and supplies and the demand bids and
supply offers cleared during day D-1 in the day-ahead
market for day D are resolved in the real-time market for
day D.
 At the end of each day D, the ISO settles all of the de-
mand and supply commitments for the day-ahead market
for day D+1 on the basis of the LMPs determined for the
day-ahead market for day D+1.
 At the end of each day D, the ISO settles all purchases
and sales in the real-time market for day D on the basis
of LMPs determined for the real-time market for day D.
IV. SELLER MARKET POWER AND MARKET EFFICIENCY
IN DAY-AHEAD ENERGY AUCTION MARKETS
Fig. 6 illustrates true total supply and demand schedules for
the peak-demand hour of a day-ahead energy double-auction
market. The initial vertical portion of the true total demand
schedule corresponds to LSE ﬁxed demand bids and the
remaining portion corresponds to LSE price-sensitive demand
bids. The ratio of ﬁxed to price-sensitive demand is calibrated
to demand data from the MISO.
As indicated in Fig. 6, buyer market power is not consid-
ered problematic in current day-ahead energy auction markets
since most bid-in demand takes the form of ﬁxed demand.
Consequently, only seller market power is considered below.
A. Detection of Seller Market Power
Although the exercise of seller market power in restructured
wholesale power markets can have substantial adverse effects
on the efﬁciency, reliability, and fairness of market operations,
it is difﬁcult to construct measures for its reliable detection
([8], [9]). Here we brieﬂy review several critical issues.
On the one hand, the complexity of the rules and regulations
governing market operations in restructured wholesale power
markets creates opportunities for GenCos to exercise seller
market power either individually or in tacit collusion. This
seller market power takes two main forms: economic with-
holding of capacity through a reporting of higher-than-true
marginal costs; and physical withholding of capacity through
a reporting of lower-than-true maximum operating capacity.
Economic withholding of capacity can induce higher prices
for cleared supply as well as out-of-merit-order dispatch,
i.e., more expensive generation dispatched in place of less
expensive generation. This results in inefﬁcient (and politically
important) transfers of wealth away from LSEs and their
downstream (retail) consumers and towards GenCos.
Physical withholding of capacity can induce higher prices
for remaining offered capacity and hence higher net earnings
for GenCos that withhold only a portion of their capacities.
It can also result in out-of-merit-order dispatch. In addition,
physical withholding of capacity increases the chances of
inadequacy events in which offered capacity is insufﬁcient
to meet total ﬁxed demand. Such events force ISOs to take
special actions such as additional reserve commitments or load
shedding to avoid the breakdown of power ﬂow on the grid.
In short, seller market power in the form of capacity
withholding results in distorted price signals as well as the
possible need for non-market ISO interventions. This hinders
the efﬁcient and fair use of existing resources as well as
the proper signalling of future transmission and generation
investment needs.
On the other hand, the physical laws governing power
ﬂow on transmission grids mean that these grids are strongly
connected networks. Injections or withdrawals of power at one
location on the grid can have substantial effects on prices and
power ﬂows at distant locations, creating the appearance of
seller market power even if no seller market power has been
deliberately exercised.
Consider, in particular, the impact of grid network effects
on prices. The locational marginal price (LMP) at each bus
of the transmission grid is deﬁned as a right-hand system
marginal cost: namely, the least cost to the system of servicing
an additional megawatt (MW) of ﬁxed (price insensitive)
demand at that bus. This additional MW of ﬁxed demand can
be serviced in three possible ways: (a) increasing generation
somewhere in the system; (b) cutting back on cleared price-
sensitive demand (if any) somewhere in the system to free
up generation for servicing the additional ﬁxed demand; or
(c) some combination of the two. The particular option used
to determine the LMP is the option resulting in the least
additional system cost.6
It follows that only GenCos that are “marginal” at a system
operating point can contribute to the determination of LMPs
at that point. A GenCo is said to be marginal if it is capable of
servicing additional demand because it is currently operating
strictly within its operating capacity limits. If the injection of
power at a particular grid location leads to grid congestion,
this will cause at least some separation of LMPs across the
grid. Moreover, this grid congestion will also result in a failure
to fully extract all possible net surplus (i.e., a deadweight loss
or congestion loss) if price-sensitive demand then has to be
curtailed.
For example, the intersection of the true total demand and
6Note that LMPs are not conceptually equivalent to the CMC price levels
deﬁned in Section II-A.7
supply curves depicted in Fig. 6 for the peak-demand hour 17
occurs at (1245MW, $32/MWh). Note that cleared demand at
this CMC point would include both ﬁxed and price-sensitive
demand. However, as shown in [7], due to congestion on the
branch between bus 1 and bus 2 only total ﬁxed demand
(1153.58MW) is actually cleared; no price-sensitive demand
is actually cleared, indicating a deadweight loss. Moreover,
the congestion causes strong LMP separation across the grid.
The LMP at bus 1 is $14.02/MWh, the LMP at bus 2 is
$78.24/MWh, the LMP at bus 3 is $66.07/MWh, the LMP at
bus 4 is $32.61/MWh, and the LMP at bus 5 is $17.32/MWh.
The average of these actual LMP values is $41.65/MWh, much
higher than the CMC price level $32/MWh depicted in Fig. 6.
As is well understood, the LMP paid to each individual non-
marginal (i.e., capacity-constrained) GenCo for each MW it
sells at its operating point can strictly exceed its left-hand
marginal cost.7 The MWs supplied by these non-marginal
GenCos constitute inframarginal quantity units, similar to the
quantity units to the left of q*=5 in Fig. 2. What is not as
well understood, however, is that an LMP at some bus k can
strictly exceed the right-hand marginal cost of all marginal
GenCos located at buses k0 6= k if grid congestion requires
out-of-merit-order dispatch.
For example, to service an additional MW of demand at
some bus k for some hour H in the presence of grid congestion
might require that less expensive generation at some second
bus k0 be backed down, e.g., by 2MWs at $20/MWh, and that
more expensive generation at some third bus k00 be brought
up, e.g., by 3MWs at $30/MWh, in order to avoid overloading
an already constrained transmission grid branch. In this case
the system marginal cost of servicing an additional MW of
demand at bus k for hour H—i.e., the LMP at bus k for hour
H—is $50/h = [3MWs($30/MWh) - 2MWs($20/MWh)]. If
the GenCo at k00 supplying 3MWs at $30/MWh has additional
operating capacity available at a marginal cost less than
$50/MWh, then the LMP at bus k strictly exceeds the right-
hand marginal cost of this marginal GenCo.
Indeed, this scenario occurs during the peak-demand hour
17 depicted in Fig. 6 for a benchmark case in which all Gen-
Cos report their true marginal costs (reservation values). At the
system operating point, the LMP at bus 2 strictly exceeds the
true right-hand marginal costs of the three marginal GenCos
1, 4, and 5 located at buses 1, 4, and 5.
Consequently, care is needed in applying standard economic
measures for the detection of seller market power that rely on
comparisons between price and marginal cost, e.g., the Lerner
Index [p   MC(q)]=p.
B. Attainment of Market Efﬁciency
This section expands upon a key point raised in [9]: the
basic form of the bid/offer-based OPF objective function used
by ISOs to determine LMPs and power commitments for day-
ahead energy markets renders problematic the attainment of
7The marginal cost curve of a capacity-constrained GenCo goes vertical at
its maximum operating capacity, implying that the right-hand marginal cost
of a GenCo at maximum operating capacity is effectively inﬁnite.
market efﬁciency.8
An LSE that has a positive ﬁxed (price-insensitive) demand
for electric power has a vertical demand schedule for these
quantity units, implying an inﬁnite maximum willingness
to pay for them. In ISO-managed day-ahead markets, ﬁxed
demand must be met in all normal market circumstances.
Consequently, this inﬁnite beneﬁt does not help to distinguish
between the efﬁciency attained under distinct (normal) market
scenarios characterized by the same ﬁxed demand because in
effect it cancels out when the beneﬁts arising under any two
of these scenarios are differenced.
For this reason, power market researchers routinely omit
consideration of LSE ﬁxed demand beneﬁts when constructing
measures for comparative market efﬁciency evaluations. A
special case of this is when all LSE demand is ﬁxed and
attention is focused solely on minimization of the total avoid-
able costs incurred in satisfying this ﬁxed demand. Here we
consider the more general case, reﬂective of many actual ISO-
managed day-ahead wholesale power markets, in which LSE
demand bids consist of both ﬁxed and price-sensitive parts.
Consider an ISO-managed day-ahead market participated in
by I GenCos and J LSEs. For each GenCo i, let k(i) denote
its bus location, and let pGi denote the quantity of electric
power that GenCo i is cleared to sell in the day-ahead market
for hour H of day D+1. Also, let LMPk(i) denote the LMP
for bus k(i) in hour H of day D+1. Assuming GenCos have
no avoidable ﬁxed costs, the net seller surplus of GenCo i
corresponding to its cleared supply pGi is




In (2), MCi(p) denotes GenCo i’s true left-hand marginal
cost (sale reservation value) for an increment dp of power,
evaluated at p.
Similarly, for each LSE j, let k(j) denote its bus location.
Also, let pS
Lj and pF
Lj denote the quantities of electric power
that LSE j is cleared to buy in the day-ahead market for hour
H of day D+1 corresponding to its price-sensitive demand
bid and its ﬁxed demand bid, respectively. Also, let LMPk(j)
denote the LMP for bus k(j) in hour H of day D+1. The
net buyer surplus of LSE j corresponding to its total cleared
demand, adjusted to omit the inﬁnite beneﬁt corresponding to






[Dj(p)]dp   LMPk(j)  pLj (3)
In (3), pLj = [pS
Lj + pF
Lj], and Dj(p) denotes LSE j’s true
left-hand maximum willingness to pay (purchase reservation
value) for an increment dp of power, evaluated at p.
The total net seller-buyer surplus attained in the day-ahead
market in hour H of day D+1, adjusted by omission of the
inﬁnite beneﬁt corresponding to LSE ﬁxed demand, thus takes
8ISOs depend on closed-source proprietary software for OPF, so the exact
form of these OPF objective functions can only be gleaned indirectly from









The objective of the ISO is the constrained maximization
of the area between the reported total supply schedule and the
reported total price-sensitive demand schedule as constructed
from the supply offers MCR
i (p) and price-sensitive demand
bids DR
j (p) of the participant GenCos and LSEs.9 More
precisely, the ISO’s objective for hour H of the day-ahead























with respect to choice of the supply and demand commitment
levels fpGi;pS
Lj j i = 1;:::;I;j = 1;:::;Jg.
The payments from LSEs and to GenCos for the day-ahead
market in day D+1 are settled through the ISO at the end
of day D. Let NetISOSurplus denote the total net payments
collected by the ISO in the day-D settlement for hour H of
the day-ahead market in day D+1. Using previously introduced











Combining (2) through (6), it is seen that





where AdjTNSBSR denotes AdjTNSBS based on supply of-
fers and demand bids rather than true reservation values.
Expression (7) shows that strategic reporting of supply
offers and demand bids results in divergence of BR   CR
from AdjTNSBS. Also, a positive value for NetISOSurplus
is a subtraction from net seller and buyer surplus. Either case
prevents attainment of market efﬁciency as standardly deﬁned.
With regard to the ﬁrst difﬁculty, ISOs generally engage the
services of independent agencies to monitor for the exercise
of market power (i.e., strategic offers and bids). However, the
experimental ﬁndings reported in ([7], [11]) suggest that seller
market power will remain a serious concern as long as the bulk
of LSE demand is passively bid in as ﬁxed demand.
With regard to the second difﬁculty, in the absence of grid
congestion and branch losses, all LMPs collapse to a single
uniform level across the grid. In this case NetISOSurplus is
zero since the total quantity of power sold is then constrained
to equal the total quantity of power bought through standard
OPF nodal balance constraints. On the other hand, Alderete
[10, Prop. 2.1] proves for a general DC OPF formulation
that NetISOSurplus is always strictly positive in the presence
of grid congestion. Also, Li et al. [7] report consistently
high positive NetISOSurplus outcomes in a suite of AMES
9Sometimes additional “unit commitment” costs are also considered, such
as no-load and start-up costs, but this does not affect the essential point of
this section.
experiments for a dynamic 5-bus test case even though grid
congestion arises on only one branch.
In response to this problem, ISOs typically distribute at least
part of their NetISOSurplus as “congestion rent” payments to
participants in Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) markets.
The basic rationale for FTRs is two-fold: to provide hedging
instruments against day-ahead market price volatility caused in
large part by congestion; and to encourage appropriate invest-
ment in new transmission capacity to alleviate the congestion
causing the positive NetISOSurplus.
As discussed in [12], however, FTR markets as designed to
date have not yet succeeded in meeting these two goals. This
issue requires further study.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As indicated in previous sections, restructured wholesale
power markets encompass extraordinarily complex dynamic
auction-market games taking place over transmission grids
exhibiting strong network effects.
Recent advances in computational modeling tools are in-
creasingly permitting researchers to address this level of
complexity [13], offering hope that auction designs can be
sufﬁciently pre-tested to prevent serious unintended conse-
quences. Nevertheless, these tools must be complemented with
increased transparency in rules of operation as well as with a
fuller and more timely release of data if useful models are to
be achieved.
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